CHT NEWS
By: Sunayan Chakma, Former President, Hill Students’ Council
(PCP)
______________________________________
1.
On February 15, 1972, shortly after the independence of
Bangladesh, 17 Jumma leaders from various political and social strata of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) met the country’s first Prime Minister (then
President) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at his official residence. They submitted a
memorandum with four demands:
a) Autonomy for the
Chittagong Hill Tracts with a provincial legislature,
b) Legal measures in
consistence with the CHT Regulation of 1900,
c) Preservation of
the traditional authority of the Chakma, Mong, and Bohmong kings, and
d) No administrative
expansion in the region without the consent of its people.
However, Sheikh Mujib, the same leader whose Awami League
party had once demanded autonomy in Pakistan, completely dismissed the hill
people’s demands. He said, “All the people of Bangladesh are Bengalis.
There is no reason to deny this truth. So forget about autonomy, go home, and
become Bengalis.”
Between 1972 and 1975, under the leadership of M.N. Larma,
preparations were made for both overground and underground movements. This
included the formation of a political party called the Parbatya Chattagram Jana
Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) and an armed wing called Shanti Bahini. The PCJSS, under
M.N. Larma, won two parliamentary seats in the CHT. Meanwhile, the Shanti
Bahini guerrillas began to expand their influence across the region.
On August 15, 1975, Sheikh Mujib and most of his family were
brutally assassinated in a military coup. Although a new government was briefly
formed under Khondaker Mostaq Ahmed, Major General Ziaur Rahman ascended to power
as the military administrator through coups and counter-coups.
As democratic space shrank, PCJSS leaders decided to initiate
guerrilla warfare, for which the Shanti Bahini had been prepared. Another
factor which contributed to this decision was India’s changing attitude toward
the new Bangladesh government after Mujib’s assassination.
On August 21, 1975, Santu Larma and Bhobotosh Dewan visited
Delhi via Agartala and met with Indian intelligence agency RAW officials. They
secured promises for guerrilla training, weapons, and the use of Indian
territory. But upon returning on August 30, Santu Larma was arrested by
Bangladeshi police from Kukichhara, Khagrachari. This arrest came at a critical
juncture—right before the guerrilla war was about to start. His capture exposed
the secret plans of India and PCJSS, dealing a serious blow to their
preparations. Priti Kumar Chakma, a senior leader, had advised Santu to avoid
main roads and travel through the jungle, but Santu ignored the advice. Many
PCJSS leaders criticized his arrest as a foolish mistake.
By September 1975, M.N. Larma had gone underground to lead
the movement in secrecy. After trained guerrillas returned from India in
1976–77, armed resistance formally began and intensified. While Santu Larma was
still imprisoned, a new chapter of armed resistance in the CHT was unfolding.
He was arrested due to his own mistake at a critical time of all-out
preparations for guerrilla war, and eventually became a tool of the Bangladesh
ruling elites.
2.
As the armed struggle intensified, the government struggled
to contain it. The Shanti Bahini grew to the strength of a brigade (at least
2,600 guerrillas), and the army suffered repeated setbacks. In response, Ziaur
Rahman initiated a plan to settle Bengalis in the CHT. But when settlers were
attacked by guerrillas, most of them fled in fear.
In this context, President Ziaur Rahman made a calculated
move: on January 23, 1980, he used special executive powers to release Santu
Larma and Chabai Marma. Zia believed that, in Santu’s absence, new leadership
had already emerged within PCJSS, so his release wouldn’t pose a risk. In fact,
Zia saw it as a strategic advantage.
Indian journalist Subir Bhaumik noted that this strategy
worked. After his release, Santu distributed a 45-page document among party
members, proposing that CHT issues could be resolved through socio-economic and
cultural development. Shockingly, the same document had already been submitted
to the Home Secretary—on the basis of which he was released. This caused deep
resentment among Shanti Bahini members. Even M.N. Larma said, “Then he’s
revealed all our secrets.”
After this betrayal, many PCJSS and Shanti Bahini leaders
opposed Santu’s reintegration, but M.N. Larma brought him back anyway. Before
leaving for India for treatment, M.N. Larma appointed Santu as acting chairman.
Santu’s first move, after assuming his new role, was to stop attacks on Muslim settlers
and dismantle the special task force led by Major Debjyoti Chakma, which had
been created to resist settler expansion.
Santu also began spreading the idea that negotiations with
the government would start soon, rendering armed struggle meaningless. He
instructed guerrillas to move freely in public markets, demoralizing and
confusing party members and slowing the movement. Soon, a bloody internal
conflict within JSS erupted—eventually claiming M.N. Larma’s life.
Meanwhile, the government took advantage of the halt in
attacks on settler villages, reinitiating their settlement program and
consolidating army control. All this became possible because of Santu’s
release—making him, for the second time, a tool for suppressing the movement.
3.
After winning the 1983–85 civil war, Santu Larma emerged as
the uncontested leader of PCJSS. However, he failed to expand the movement or
launch significant operations against the military, despite Indian aid. His
armed struggle mostly targeted settler villages. This backfired when organized
settlers and the military launched counter-attacks on indigenous villages,
forcing many to flee to India and lose their ancestral lands—lands they haven’t
recovered to this day.
A key question arises: Why did Santu first stop attacks on
settlers after his release in 1980, only to resume them after winning the civil
war? His ceasefire allowed settlers to organize and entrench themselves. Later,
his ill-timed attacks gave settlers an excuse to retaliate, displacing
indigenous people. Whether intentional or not, these decisions only benefited
the government, military, and Bengali settlers.
Even after winning the civil war, Santu failed to revive the
movement. In 1989, the government introduced local government councils (Zila
Parishads) in three districts. Though JSS announced a boycott, elections were
held anyway. Their failure to prevent the elections demoralized JSS. The army
created “cluster villages” (essentially concentration camps) and used
paramilitary groups to suppress the movement. Shanti Bahini members surrendered
en masse. In short, under Santu’s leadership, the movement collapsed.
Against this backdrop, on May 20, 1989, the Hill Students’
Council (PCP) was born. It soon became the center of the political movement of
the Jumma people. Massive student-led protests shook the hills, forcing the
government and army into a defensive position. Only then did PCJSS find some
breathing room.
As the student-led democratic movement gained momentum,
pressure mounted on the government to resolve the CHT crisis politically. After
Ershad’s dictatorship fell in 1990, the new government of Khaleda Zia began
dialogue with PCJSS. Yet in a surprising speech on June 15, 1995, after meeting
the government, Santu told the public: “You can’t achieve autonomy by slinging
stones or waging militant movements.” This was an allusion to the Hill
Students’ Council initiated movement. His words were seen as a betrayal of the
hard-earned struggle.
Soon after, the army formed the Mukhosh Bahini, using it to
attack PCP, the Hill People’s Council, and Hill Women’s Federation. Instead of
using the students’ movement to gain leverage at the negotiating table, Santu
moved to weaken and suppress it. Thus, for the third time, he became a tool of
the ruling regime.
4.
After winning the 1996 elections, the Awami League signed the
CHT Accord with PCJSS on December 2, 1997. PCJSS surrendered arms. However,
instead of working to implement the Accord or continuing the movement, Santu
Larma initiated a fratricidal conflict with the United People’s Democratic
Front (UPDF). Over 27 years, this conflict has claimed around 600 lives and
effectively derailed the Jumma peoples’ movement. UPDF repeatedly called for
unity and offered joint struggle—but Santu rejected these overtures.
After 15 years of authoritarian rule, a mass uprising on July
5, 2024, overthrew the Awami League. The success of this movement inspired hill
students, who formed the “Anti-Conflict and Anti-Discrimination Hill
Student Movement.” They organized major rallies in Khagrachari and
Rangamati, with the potential to transform into a mass movement. For the first
time in years, there was hope. But Santu Larma snuffed it out.
The students’ core demands were: an end to the fratricidal
conflict initiated by JSS (Santu faction), equal rights for all nationalities,
full implementation of the CHT Accord, and indigenous recognition. The student
movement reached out to all parties, including UPDF and JSS, for a united
front.
Although the implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
(CHT) Accord and the recognition of indigenous peoples have long been key
demands of the JSS (Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti), mysteriously, the
student movement faced obstruction from the JSS (Santu faction) leadership. The
JSS often claims that the continued fratricidal conflict in the CHT is due to
the UPDF’s opposition to the Accord. However, despite their democratic
criticisms, the UPDF has never actively obstructed the implementation of the
Accord. On the contrary, in the broader interest of the movement, they pledged
full support if students organized protests around these two demands.
Even though 99% of the hill people of the CHT, including the
UPDF, united under the call of the ‘Anti-Conflict and Anti-Discrimination Hill
Student Movement’ to demand the implementation of the Accord, Santu Larma and
his group failed to respond. Instead of supporting the student movement, the
faction led by Santu Larma sought to weaken it by creating obstacles. They
threatened the coordinators of the student movement, disrupted the protests in
various ways, and eventually, in collusion with the government, filed false
cases against them and destroyed the movement. Without the collaboration of the
JSS (Santu faction), the government or the military could never have suppressed
the student protests. Earlier attempts by the military regime to incite
violence through extremist settler groups in Dighinala, Khagrachari, and
Rangamati also failed to quell the movement.
Fundamentally, due to the flawed political stance of the JSS,
the “Anti-Conflict and Anti-Discrimination Hill Student Movement”
could not emerge as a powerful force even in a promising period. Acting in
favor of the military regime, the PCJSS directly obstructed the movement, and
as a result, the opportunity for a large-scale student uprising in the CHT
after the fall of the Hasina government was completely lost—due to the JSS
(Santu) leaders. Thus, for the fourth time, Santu Larma became a tool in the
hands of the ruling regime to suppress the Jumma people’s movement.
In conclusion, although there have been several opportunities
for united movements in the CHT, they have repeatedly failed due to Santu
Larma. He has destroyed all prospects for unity-driven movements for his
personal interests. For this, history will never forgive him. However, Santu
Larma’s era will not last forever. Just as even a crocodile eventually dies, so
too will Santu Larma fall. One day, the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
will undoubtedly unite and reclaim their rights through a collective movement.
(The End)
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